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Abstract 
This article estimates the marginal value of safety based on contingent values obtained in a labor- 
market-oriented national random-sample mail survey. Thus, worker preferences for safety are assessed 
directly, in contrast to the hedonic price method that  has been used almost exclusively in related 
studies. Key aspects of this article are that (1) contingent values are obtained for small changes in risks 
of job-related fatal accidents perceived  by respondents, and (2) relationships are analyzed between re- 
spondents'  marginal  safety values  and  their  income,  socioeconomic/demographic characteristics, 
union membership status, and initial levels of risk faced. 
Marginal value of safety estimates from labor market data generally have been ob- 
tained using empirical hedonic wage models. As discussed more fully in reviews 
by  Smith  (1979), Marin  and  Psacharopoulos  (1982),  Dickens (1984),  and  Dil- 
lingham (1985), these estimates are marked by wide divergence and conspicuous 
anomalies. Reasons cited for this outcome include problems of measuring fatal 
and nonfatal job-related accident risks, failure to adequately control for human 
capital and workplace characteristics, and differential bargaining strength of un- 
ionized workers. While the importance of such factors should not be minimized, 
exclusive focus on them draws attention away from another serious issue. Gegax, 
Gerking, and Schulze (1987) argue that there are many types of  jobs in which fatal 
accident risks do not enter the production function. In this situation, the marginal 
product of risk is zero, no hedonic gradient exists, and the value of alterations in 
safety must be assessed in settings other than the labor market and/or using alter- 
natives to the hedonic price method. 
This article estimates the marginal value of safety by directly asking respon- 
dents in a  national random-sample mail survey about their willingness to sub- 186  GERKING, DE HAAN, AND SCHULZE 
stitute money for changes in job-related fatal accident risks. Two versions of this 
approach, referred to as contingent valuation, are considered: respondents stated 
either willingness to pay for a  specified reduction in job-related fatal accident 
risks, or additional compensation required to willingly accept an increase in such 
risks. Thus, worker preferences for safety are directly measured, in contrast to the 
hedonic price method which focuses on the locus of tangency points between 
worker indifference curves and firm isoprofit curves in the wage-risk plane. Vis- 
cusi and O'Connor (1984)  previously elicited willingness to  accept contingent 
values for nonfatal job accident risks in their study of chemical workers. The pres- 
ent study apparently is the first to obtain in a labor market context (1) contingent 
values for fatal risks, and (2) willingness to pay, as contrasted with willingness to 
accept,  values  to  avoid  those  risks.  Numerous  contingent  valuation  studies, 
however, recently have been conducted in related settings such as traffic safety 
(Jones-Lee, Hammerton, and Philips,  1985), water quality (Desvousges, Smith, 
and Fisher,  1987) and exposure to toxic wastes (Smith and  Desvousges,  1987). 
Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze (1986) critically evaluate uses of contingent 
valuation in environmental benefit assessment. 
The following discussion also considers three aspects of the contingent valua- 
tion data to sharpen interpretation of the marginal value of safety estimates. First, 
contingent values are obtained for small changes in risks of job-related fatal ac- 
cidents perceived by respondents. Measurement of perceived risk is a central issue 
in computing marginal value of safety estimates--one that has failed, with few ex- 
ceptions (see, for example, Viscusi and O'Connor,  1984), to receive suffcient at- 
tention in existing literature. Psychologists have long argued that the cognitive 
process used to form risk beliefs is complex and often leads to perceptions that are 
inconsistent with objective measures of risk (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1984; 
Lichtenstein et al., 1978). Second, relationships are analyzed between respondents' 
marginal safety values and their income and socioeconomic/demographic char- 
acteristics  (e.g.,  race,  gender,  union  membership  status,  education).  Parallel 
analyses often are undertaken in hedonic wage-risk studies (see, for example, 
Thaler and Rosen, 1976; Viscusi, 1978; Olson, 1981; and Worrall and Butler, 1983). 
Yet, the present study provides a  unique opportunity to examine these interac- 
tions from the standpoint of worker preferences alone. Third, relationships are 
analyzed between marginal safety values and initial levels of risk faced. In con- 
trast to Smith and Desvousges (1987), results presented below show a significant 
positive association between these two variables. 
The remainder of the article is divided into three sections. Section 1 discusses 
the mail survey data. Section 2 analyzes contingent values in detail and shows 
their relationship to other variables measured in the mail survey. Implications and 
conclusions are drawn out in section 3. 
1.  Mail survey data 
Empirical work in this study uses data collected by national mail survey during 
summer,  1984.  Implementation  of the  mail  survey  closely  followed  Dillman's THE MARGINAL VALUE OF JOB SAFETY  187 
(1978) total design method. For example, care was taken in preparing cover letters 
and survey materials sent to respondents. Postcard reminders were sent eight days 
after the initial mailing. A replacement questionnaire and cover letter was sent to 
everyone who had not responded within three weeks. A more complete description 
of the survey methodology, questionnaire pretesting, and copies of all materials 
can be found in Gegax et al. (1985). 
Survey  materials  were  sent  to  (1)  a  simple  random  sample  of  3000  U.S. 
households, and (2) 3000 additional households randomly selected from 105 coun- 
ties that have disproportionately large concentrations  of high-risk industries. In 
the second component, the sample included an equal number of households (750) 
from the northeast, northcentral, south, and west regions of the U.S. 1  Of 6000 ques- 
tionnaries  mailed,  749  (12.5%)  were  returned  as  undeliverable  and  2103  were 
returned in completed form. Thus, the net response rate was about 40%. 
Although  the response rate was reasonably good in light of length and com- 
plexity of the questionnaire,  it does raise questions about possible biases in the 
resulting  sample.  A  general  problem with  mail  surveys is that better-educated, 
higher-income  individuals  tend  to  respond  with  greater  frequency than  other 
groups. The present survey is no exception. Dickie and Gerking (1988), who use 
these data to test for interregional wage equality, note that in a restricted sample of 
full-time workers very similar to the one analyzed in section 2, 6.8% did not com- 
plete high school, as compared with 16.5% of employed civilians aged 25 or older 
in the U.S. Also, 43.9% of workers were employed as managers or professionals as 
compared with 26.4% in the general U.S. population. Therefore, a cost of using the 
mail  survey  approach  may be  an  undersampling  of low-human-capital-low- 
income workers. If  job safety is a normal good, then workers in high-risk jobs may 
be underrepresented  in the present sample. 
Three types of information  were obtained from the head of each responding 
household.  First, the survey developed two measures of each household head's 
perceived risk of a fatal accident at work. With respect to the first measure, respon- 
dents were shown a list of 13 major causes of death at work (e.g., motor vehicle ac- 
cident,  electrocution, gun  shot, explosion) and  asked to rank  the likelihood of 
each occurring to them on an ordinal integer scale with 1 labeled "Could Never 
Happen" and 5 labeled "Most Likely to Happen." This exercise encouraged re- 
spondents to review various sources of accidental death risk on their own job and 
to evaluate which, if any, of these sources posed a  credible threat.  The variable 
RISK1 then was computed for each respondent by averaging his rankings across 
sources of perceived job-related fatality risk. Immediately after providing informa- 
tion needed for RISK1, respondents were shown an illustration of a  ladder (see 
figure  1) with ten equally spaced steps. For reasons elaborated below, each step 
denoted the number of annual job-related fatal accidents per 4000 workers. Seven 
example occupations were placed on the ladder according to their average levels 
of job-related  risk  of death  ranging  from  relatively  safe jobs  such  as  school- 
teachers to more dangerous jobs such as lumberjacks. Respondents then specified 
the step number, which defined the variable RISK2, that most closely described 
their risk of  job-related accidental death. It is worth emphasizing that both RISK1 188  GERKING, DE HAAN, AND SCHULZE 
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Fig.  1.  Risk ladder shown to survey respondents. 
and RISK2 measure perceived risks of accidental  death  on the job and  may be 
viewed  as  disaggregated  versions  of the  DANGER  variable  used  by Viscusi 
(1979). 
Procedures used to construct RISK2 are worth further elaboration. The risk lad- 
der scale and six of the seven example occupations are based on data presented in 
Thaler  and  Rosen (1976,  p.  288).  These  data  measure  extra  deaths  per  100,000 
policy years of life insurance underwriting experience after subtracting expected 
deaths by age and occupation based on sample records and standard life tables. 
For example, in the Thaler and Rosen sample, lumbermen had 256 extra deaths 
per 100,000 policy years (or approximately ten extra deaths per 4000 policy years). 
Consequently, this example occupation was placed on the tenth rung of the risk 
ladder. Similar calculations were made for structural ironworkers, miners, crane- 
men and derrickmen, electricians, and painters, and these occupations were ap- 
propriately placed on the ladder. Schoolteachers, an occupational group not con- 
sidered by Thaler  and  Rosen, were arbitrarily  assigned to the  first rung  of the 
ladder. 
The  mean of RISK2 in the  sample analyzed in the  following section is 2.64. 
Thus, the average perceived risk of death was less than one in 2000. This com- 
paratively large figure may be partly an outcome of using the Thaler and Rosen 
data to calibrate the risk ladder. Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) point out that if 
occupational and nonoccupational death risks are positively correlated, then the 
Thaler and Rosen data would overestimate occupational  death  risks. Also, the 
comparatively high mean value may indicate that respondents overperceived fatal THE MARGINAL VALUE OF JOB SAFETY  189 
accident risks. Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor, 1986) data 
on actual fatal accidents by industry indicate average death probabilities on the 
order of one worker in 5000 to 10,000 per year. Reinforcing the point on overper- 
ception of risk is the  fact that,  as previously noted, high-income,  high-human- 
capital individuals are overrepresented in the sample, implying an underrepresen- 
tation of workers in high-risk jobs. 
The second type of information collected pertains to the contingent valuation 
analysis. Half of the surveys asked how large an increase in annual wages would 
induce repondents to voluntarily work at the same job if risk of accidental death 
were one step higher on the ladder than where they placed their initial assessment. 
The other half of the surveys asked how large a decrease in annual wages respon- 
dents willingly would forego if their job-related risk of death were moved one step 
lower on the ladder. Thus, the former question asks for willingness to accept, the 
latter asks for willingness to pay, and both make use of the ladder used to construct 
RISK2. For the contingent valuation questions, then, respondents had to assess for 
themselves how much incremental  risk was involved in a one-step move on the 
ladder. The only subjective way they would have to understand this change in risk 
would be to imagine the threats involved to workers in the various example jobs 
used on the ladder. Therefore, the quality of marginal value of safety estimates ob- 
tained from the survey depends critically on an understanding  of the change in 
risk presented. 2 
To answer the valuation question, respondents marked one of 37 boxes denot- 
ing dollar amounts ranging from $0 to more than $6000 that most closely approx- 
imated willingness to pay or willingness to accept for a one-step movement on the 
risk ladder. However, individuals receiving the willingness-to-pay version whose 
initial  job  risk  assessment was placed on the  first rung  of the  ladder,  and  in- 
dividuals  receiving  the  willingness-to-accept  version whose initial  job  risk  as- 
sessment was placed on the tenth rung, were unable to make this one-step move. 
As a consequence, these willingness-to-pay respondents were instructed to bid on 
movement from the second to the first rung and willingness-to-accept respondents 
were asked how much money they would require to induce them to move from 
rung nine to rung ten. Of the willingness-to-pay respondents included in the final 
data set (the composition of which is discussed below), 50.9% placed their initial 
level of job risk on the first rung of the ladder--a  result that indicates that the 
range of risks depicted may have been too narrow. Correspondingly,  1.2% of the 
willingness to accept respondents placed their initial risk level on the tenth rung of 
the ladder. 
Third,  the  survey also measures  respondents' human  capital, workplace, and 
socioeconomic characteristics.  Key variables used in this  study are (1) years of 
schooling, (2) whether head is a union member, (3) years of age, (4) race, (5) gender, 
and (6) annual  labor earnings.  More precise definitions of variables used in the 
analysis are presented in table  1 in section 2. 
As previously indicated, completed questionnaires were received from 2103 re- 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 192  GERKING, DE HAAN, AND SCHULZE 
in the analysis. Responses from 872 retired or unemployed individuals were ex- 
cluded, since the job risk and labor earnings questions did not apply to them. Ad- 
ditionally,  responses  from  32  individuals  who  did  not  answer  the  contingent 
valuation questions were dropped. Also excluded were 338 individuals who did 
not supply key information  related to contingent values, such as labor earnings 
and initial level of job risk faced. These restrictions reduced the original number 
of respondents to a  sample size of 861 observations. 
2.  Analyzing contingent values 
Mean contingent valuation bids for a one-step move on the risk ladder are $665 
for the willingness-to-pay questionnaires and $1705  for the willingness-to-accept 
version. Multiplying these values by 4000 yields marginal value of safety estimates 
of $2.66  million  and  $6.82  million  for  the  two  subsamples.  Both  values  are 
significantly greater than zero using a t-test. Thus, the contingent values should 
not be automatically dismissed as purely random or ill-considered responses to a 
hypothetical  question.  Also,  the  distribution  of both  willingness-to-pay  and 
willingness-to-accept  responses  are  positively  skewed  with  medians  less  than 
means. Partially responsible for this outcome is the comparatively large number 
of zero bids: 47.4% of the willingness-to-pay contingent values were zero and the 
corresponding figure for willingness-to-accept contingent values was 23.2%. This 
clustering of bids at zero may reflect the previously mentioned  narrow range of 
risks shown on the ladder. Alternatively, it may mean that some workers do not 
bother to calculate small positive bids and simply report zero instead. A decision 
to edit or deny the value of small risk reductions in certain situations is in fact a 
rational  response to the innumerable  risks which are present in daily life.  Only 
some risks can receive attention given limited resources. Thus, the many zero bids 
likely reflect a  prior decision by respondents to edit their own job-related risks. 
Notice that the mean willingness-to-accept estimate of the marginal  value of 
safety exceeds that obtained using the willingness-to-pay approach by a factor of 
approximately 2.5. This finding is sirnilar to results reported by Knetsch and Sin- 
den (1984), Brookshire and Coursey (1987),  Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze (1987), 
and  Viscusi, Magat,  and  Huber (1987)  showing that  willingness-to-accept con- 
tingent values are larger than those obtained in a willingness-to-pay framework. 
Additionally, it is consistent with the observation that people are reluctant to ac- 
cept involuntary risks. Since labor markets are voluntary institutions, it may well 
be  the  case  that  hedonic  studies  of wages  and  risk  reveal  willingness-to-pay 
values. 
The contingent valuation willingness-to-pay estimate ($2.66 million) is close to 
Viscusi's (1978) widely cited $3.4 million estimate (in 1984 dollars) and lies within 
Dillingham's (1985)"best-guess" range of marginal safety values ($1.3-$2.7 million 
in 1984 dollars) based on his analysis of labor market studies. Thus, the contingent THE MARGINAL VALUE OF JOB SAFETY  193 
valuation willingness-to-pay estimate of the marginal value of safety is  not im- 
plausible in light of results from previous labor market studies. 
Further  analysis  of both  willingness-to-pay and  willingness-to-accept con- 
tingent values reveals interesting relationships with other variables. This analysis 
was undertaken by estimating the effects of explanatory variables including an- 
nual labor earnings, race, gender, age, union membership, schooling, and initial 
level of risk laced in the contingent valuation bid to move one step on the risk lad- 
der. Estimates of this relationship were obtained using a two-limit tobit procedure 
because of  the large proportion of zero bids and the truncation of the bid distribu- 
tion  at  $6000. All  observations  in  each  subsample  are  used  in the  regression 
analysis. 
Use of all observations represents a departure from practices often followed in 
contingent valuation studies in which attempts are made to eliminate protest and/ 
or outlier bids prior to statistical analysis. As  noted by Smith and Desvousges 
(1987), protest bids can be defined as zero bids given by respondents for reasons 
other than  as a  reflection of the value of alteration in risk or as an indication of 
budget limitations. Outlier bids, on the other hand, can be defined as influential or 
implausible  bids  and  identified using  both  statistical  and  nonstatistical  pro- 
cedures. Both types of troublesome bids, however, are more easily defined than 
identified, and methods used to determine which bids to ignore are arbitrary. For 
example, Rowe and Chestnut (1987) suggest throwing out bids that violate pre- 
specified consistency checks based on income or the cost of obtaining by other 
means the good for which the bid was obtained. Jones-Lee, Hammerton, and 
Philips (1985) trimmed bid distributions by removing upper tail responses that 
displayed discontinuity in terms of order of magnitude in relation to other re- 
sponses. Also, Smith and Desvousges analyze only positive bids using Heckman's 
(1979) two-step estimator to correct for the sample selection effects that result from 
dropping the zero bids. This latter approach may well eliminate some valid bids 
that simply happen to be  zero, and does not identify outlier bids. In any case, 
rather than resort to bid elimination procedures that would end up being difficult 
to defend, all usable observations were included in the data set. 3 
Table  1  presents  two-limit tobit  estimates  from  the  willingness-to-pay and 
willingness-to-accept subsamples. The dependent variable in each regression is 
the contingent valuation bid to move one rung up, in the case of willingness to 
accept, or down, in the case of  willingness to pay, on the risk ladder. The t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates, and summary statis- 
tics provided at the bottom of the table indicate that the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between the dependent variables and all explanatory variables would 
be  rejected at conventional significance levels.  Also, previously promised defi- 
nitions of explanatory variables are given in the second column. 
Most of these variable  definitions are  straightforward; however, RISK1  and 
STEP1 require further elaboration. RISK1 was created by adding the ordinal 1-to- 
5 rankings of perceived likelihood of death from each major accidental cause and 194  GERKING, DE HAAN, AND SCHULZE 
dividing  by number  of causes considered  (13).  STEP1  reflects whether a  will- 
ingness-to-pay respondent initially placed his job on the first rung of the risk lad- 
der. Recall that because these respondents could not then move down a step, they 
were asked to bid on a move from the second rung to the first. A variable corre- 
sponding  to  STEP1  was  not  included  in  the  willingness-to-accept  regressions 
because only 1.2% of respondents in this subsample placed their initial level of risk 
on the tenth rung of the risk ladder. 
Results presented in table 1 use RISK1 rather than RISK2. RISK2 performed 
poorly in all  regressions (both  for willingness-to-pay  and willingness-to-accept 
subsamples) in which it was included. Coefficients of RISK2 (not presented) oc- 
casionally were  negative  and  seldom had  t-statistics  exceeding .50  in  absolute 
value.  As  discussed  more  fully below, coefficients  of RISK1  are  positive  and 
significant at conventional levels. The Pearson correlation between RISK1  and 
RISK2 is approximately .46 in each of the two subsamples. One explanation for 
the difference in performance of these two variables is that the question on which 
RISK1 is based provided respondents with more perceptual cues or reminders of 
risk than did the risk ladder. In other words, they found it easier to subjectively 
assess the chance of occurrence of specific causes of accidental death than to place 
their job on a risk ladder in comparison with seven example occupations. A sec- 
ond explanation may be that the small number of rungs on the risk ladder pre- 
vented precise coefficient estimation. Yet the risk ladder still may have aided re- 
spondents  in  thinking  through  how much  a  unit  change  in  risk  is  worth  to 
them. 
Estimates presented in table  1 show effects of earnings,  perceived initial  risk 
levels, race, age, gender, union membership status, and schooling on willingness- 
to-pay and willingness-to-accept contingent valuation bids for a small change in 
job safety. The first willingness-to-pay regression (see column 3 of table 1) shows 
strong positive relationships between the contingent valuation bid and EARN and 
RISK1. Thus, higher bids were obtained from respondents with higher levels of 
1983 labor earnings and who perceived greater likelihoods of accidental death on 
their jobs. The positive coefficient of EARN was expected given the presumption 
that a reduction in the probability of a job-related fatal accident is a normal good. 
Additionally,  the  positive coefficient of RISK1  suggests that  respondent  indif- 
ference curves are upward sloping in the money-risk plane. This result sharply 
contrasts with the negative association between option price bids and baseline risk 
levels found by Smith and  Desvousges (1987).  Moreover, it supports theoretical 
analyses of Jones-Lee (1974)  and Weinstein,  Shepard,  and Pliskin (1980)  which 
demonstrate that under plausible assumptions, individuals  would be willing to 
pay larger amounts to avoid a unit of risk reduction, the higher the initial level of 
risk faced. 
The relationship between willingness to pay and perceived initial risk levels is 
further analyzed in the regression shown in the fourth column of table 1. There is 
only one difference in specification between this regression and the one shown in 
column 3:RISK1 has been dropped and the dummy variable LOWRISK has been THE MARGINAL VALUE OF JOB SAFETY  195 
added. As indicated in the table, LOWRISK measures whether RISK1 is less than 
its mean value of 2,23. Thus, the negative coefficient of LOWRISK indicates that 
respondents facing below-average perceived risk levels are willing to pay less for a 
one-step  movement  down the  risk  ladder  than  are  respondents  facing  above- 
average perceived risk levels. This finding is consistent with contingent valuation 
willingness-to-pay results in the Jones-Lee, Hammerton, and Phitips (t985) study 
suggesting that willingness to pay to avoid risk of death in a traffic safety context is 
an increasing, concave function of risk reduction. 
Returning to the column 3 regression, other results of interest are that willing- 
ness to pay to avoid job-related fatal accident risks tends to be larger for older 
workers. The coefficient of AGE, however, with t-statistic of approximately 1.60, is 
not significantly different from zero at the 10% level using a two-tail test. Yet, this 
positive  coefficient does  provide  weak evidence that  workers  may become  in- 
creasingly averse to job-related fatal accidents as they age. Additionally, the coeffi- 
cient of UNION has a particularly small t-statistic of -0.011. Thus, preferences of 
union  members  for job safety are  not different from those of nonunion  mem- 
bers--a result that at first may be surprising in light of most previous labor market 
studies.  Viscusi  (1978),  Dickens  (1984),  Olson  (1981),  and  Worrall  and  Butler 
(1983),  for example, note significant wage premiums earned by union members 
who work at riskier jobs and zero (even occasionally negative) wage premiums for 
nonunion  members who work at riskier jobs.  4 
One  explanation  for  these  results  may  be  that  unions  alter  the  wage-risk 
tradeoffeven though union members' preferences for risk do not differ from those 
of nonunion members. This alteration in the wage-risk relationship may reflect a 
mechanism through which unions capture their economic rents. Another possible 
explanation  may lie in differences in risk perceptions between union and non- 
union  workers.  As  demonstrated  by Viscusi  (1983),  unions  play a  key role  in 
collecting and  disseminating job-related risk information,  thus increasing  their 
members' awareness of safety hazards.  Moreover, unionized jobs may be riskier 
than jobs in the nonunion sector. In the mail survey data, unionized workers per- 
ceived  somewhat  greater  levels  of risk  on  their  jobs  than  did  nonunionized 
workers. Averages of RISK1 and RISK2 were 2.44 and 3.30 for unionized workers 
and 2.11 and 2.23, respectively, for nonunion members. More jobs in the nonunion 
sector, therefore, may have low odds of a fatal accident and for a larger share of 
these jobs, fatal accident risks may not enter the production function. Thus, the 
marginal product of increased job-related fatal accidents is zero and no hedonic 
wage-risk  gradient  exists.  Yet,  as  reflected  in  the  insignificant  coefficient  of 
UNION, there may be little difference between union and nonunion worker pref- 
erences to avoid fatal accident hazards while on the job. 
The coefficient of RACE is negative and significant at the 5% level using a two- 
tail  test, indicating  that  nonwhites  are  willing to pay more  for safety than  are 
whites. Additionally, the positive, but barely significant, coefficients of SCHOOL1 
and  SCHOOL2 suggest that willingness to pay for safety decreases with formal 
education levels (note that SCHOOL3 is the omitted schooling dummy) and the 196  GERKING, DE HAAN, AND SCHULZE 
small t-statistic on the coefficient of GENDER indicates no difference in prefer- 
ences for safety between males and females. Although results for these socioec- 
onomic  characteristics  are  not  totally  implausible,  they  may  occur,  in  part, 
because  of confounding  with  the  perceived  risk  measure.  Nonwhites  and  in- 
dividuals with lower levels of schooling may work at riskier jobs than  do more 
highly educated whites. Thus, the negative coefficient of RACE and the positive 
coefficients of SCHOOL1 and SCHOOL2 simply may reflect effects of perceived 
risk on contingent valuation willingness to pay bids. Finally, the positive coeffi- 
cient of STEP1 is significantly different from zero only at the 20% level using a 
two-tail test. Thus, workers who rated their initial level of job safety on the lowest 
rung of the risk ladder do not appear to have a strong tendency to give different 
contingent valuation willingness-to-pay bids than other workers. 
Willingness-to-accept contingent  valuation  estimates,  shown in the  fifth  and 
sixth columns of table 1, are similar to those for willingness to pay in two respects. 
First,  coefficients of EARN and  RISK1  are  positive with  t-statistics  of 2.85  or 
greater. Also, the coefficient of LOWRISK (see column 6) is negative and signifi- 
cant at the 10% level using a two-tail test, thus providing additional evidence that 
indifference curves increase at an increasing rate in the money-risk plane. Sec- 
ond, coefficients of UNION and GENDER are  not significantly different from 
zero at conventional levels, again implying that preferences for safety do not differ 
between union and  nonunion workers or between males and  females. Key dif- 
ferences between the willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept regressions are 
that, in the latter, coefficients of RACE, SCHOOL1, and SCHOOL2 have small t- 
statistics. Additionally, the constant terms in the willingness-to-accept regressions 
are larger, thus reflecting the larger mean bid obtained when using this method as 
compared with willingness to pay. Using a Z  2 test, the null hypothesis of no dif- 
ference  between the  coefficients  in  the  willingness-to-pay  and  willingness-to- 
accept regressions is rejected at the  1% level. 
3.  Conclusions 
This article has presented marginal value of safety estimates obtained in a labor 
market context using the contingent valuation method. This method has the virtue 
of focusing directly on how workers substitute job risk for money. Data collected 
from  a  national  random  sample  mail  survey were used to  measure  both  will- 
ingness-to-accept  and  willingness-to-pay values to  avoid job-related  fatal  acci- 
dent risks. Thus, the analysis is similar to that in Viscusi and O'Connor (1984) who 
measured the willingness of chemical workers to accept small increases in nonfa- 
tal job-related risk. Yet this study is the first to examine (1) contingent values for 
job-related fatal accidents, and (2) willingness to pay for increased job safety. The 
distinction between willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay values is impor- 
tant because, on average, the former are about 2.5 times the latter. Moreover, the 
average willingness-to-pay estimate  of $2.66  million  is  roughly consistent with THE MARGINAL VALUE OF JOB SAFETY  197 
marginal value of safety estimates obtained by applying the hedonic price method 
to unionized and/or blue-collar workers. 
A  key feature of mail survey data is the measurement of perceived job-related 
fatal  accident  risks.  Psychologists have  argued that  risk beliefs  may be  incon- 
sistent with objective measures of risk. Measurement of these beliefs, however, has 
received little  attention to date  in the  safety literature  except for the  previously 
cited article by Viscusi and O'Connor. In any case, the relationship between con- 
tingent values, perceived risk and other variables is  analyzed using a  two-limit 
tobit procedure. Contingent values increase at an increasing rate with initial levels 
of perceived job-related  fatal risk,  a  result that stands in contrast to findings of 
Smith and Desvousges (1987) in their study of toxic waste exposure hazards. Ad- 
ditionally, contingent values are unaffected by union membership status.  Large 
differences between marginal safety values of union and nonunion workers repre- 
sent a  major source of controversy in the hedonic labor market safety literature. 
Thus, the present study suggests that nonunion workers have similar preferences 
for safety as do union workers, and that for public policy purposes, marginal value 
of safety estimates obtained for one group can be applied to the other. 
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Notes 
1.  Difference between means tests were performed for each variable measured in the two subsam- 
ples. None of these tests rejected the null hypothesis of no difference at the 5% level. Surprisingly, per- 
centages of respondents in one-digit occupation and industry classifications were not significantly  dif- 
ferent between the two subsamples even though the latter characteristics were a basis for selecting 
counties with disproportionately high levels of employment in high-risk industries. As a consequence, 
the methods used here to identify  potential respondents in risky  jobs were judged to be ineffective. Yet, 
empirical work was simplified because unweighted data from the two subsamples simply could be 
pooled. 
2. The situation for hedonic studies of  wages and job safety is in reality quite similar in that workers 
must base their actual risk-motivated behavior on subjective assessments of  job risks. These subjective 
assessments are based on perceptual cues or reminders of risk in the workplace (loud noises, fences, 
hardhats~ warning signs, etc) as well as on experience (especially recent experience) with specific 
sources of danger. Thus, both contingent valuation and hedonic labor market studies are based on 
worker's perceptions of  risk either based on information presented in the survey  instrument or on avail- 
able information presented in and around the workplace, respectively. 198  GERKING, DE HAAN, AND SCHULZE 
3.  In preliminary work, the Smith and Desvousges adaptation of Heckman's two-step estimator was 
applied to both the willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept subsamples. However, ordinary leash 
squares  coefficient estimates  in the  second  step  to explain the positive contingent valuation bids 
proved to be highly dependent on the variables selected for inclusion in the first-step probit regression. 
As a consequence, this approach was not pursued further. 
4.  Note that Dillingham and Smith (1984) found little support for this conclusion in their analysis of 
May, 1979 Current Population Survey data. 
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